Waging the War for Talent: Do Recruitment and Screening Strategies Raise Employee Performance? by DeVaro, Jed & Fields, Gary S
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Working Papers ILR Collection 
May 2005 
Waging the War for Talent: Do Recruitment and Screening 
Strategies Raise Employee Performance? 
Jed DeVaro 
Cornell University, jed.devaro@csueastbay.edu 
Gary S. Fields 
Cornell University ILR School, gsf2@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Working Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Waging the War for Talent: Do Recruitment and Screening Strategies Raise 
Employee Performance? 
Abstract 
We use data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality to provide an empirical answer to the question, 
“Do recruitment and screening strategies raise employee performance?” Our approach differs from 
previous empirical work in that we allow for changes in screening behavior to accompany changes in 
recruitment behavior. In the end, our results are consistent with those of the previous literature that 
ignores the auxiliary effect of recruitment through screening, in that we find no effect of recruitment 
methods on worker performance. 
Keywords 
ecruitment, screening, worker performance 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
DeVaro, J., & Fields, G. S. (2005). Waging the war for talent: Do recruitment and screening strategies raise 
employee performance? Retrieved [insert date] from Cornell University, ILR School site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/74/ 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/74 
 1
 
WAGING THE WAR FOR TALENT:   
DO RECRUITMENT AND SCREENING STRATEGIES  
RAISE EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE? 
 
 
 
Jed DeVaro  
268 Ives Hall 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, NY 14853 
(607) 255-8407 
devaro@cornell.edu  
 
and 
 
Gary Fields 
250 Ives Hall 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, NY 14853 
(607) 255-4561 
gsf2@cornell.edu 
 
 
May 25, 2005 
 
 
JEL Classification: M51 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We use data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality to provide an empirical answer to the 
question, “Do recruitment and screening strategies raise employee performance?”  Our approach 
differs from previous empirical work in that we allow for changes in screening behavior to 
accompany changes in recruitment behavior.  In the end, our results are consistent with those of 
the previous literature that ignores the auxiliary effect of recruitment through screening, in that 
we find no effect of recruitment methods on worker performance.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The battle to attract, develop, and retain talent remains of critical importance to 
companies (Johnson, 2000; Michaels, Handfield-Jones, and Axelrod, 2001; Tulgan, 2001; 
Watson-Wyatt, 2002; Ashby and Miles, 2002; Nalbantian et al., 2004; Florida, 2005.  Employers 
are still seeking to hire the right people as quickly and cheaply as possible.  This paper addresses 
one element of this decision: how to recruit and screen job candidates to attract and hire high-
performing employees.  This information will be of interest to employers as they select 
recruitment and screening methods to try to raise employee performance.  
Empirical answers to the question of what recruitment and screening methods raise 
performance have been offered in the literature.  Many of the studies find that no recruitment or 
screening method raises performance.  For example, Holzer (1987a) regressed a subjective 
employer-reported performance measure (on a scale of 0 to 100) on recruitment methods, 
screening methods, and personal characteristics such as age, gender, and experience in the 
previously held position.  He found that no recruitment methods were statistically significant 
while some screening methods had a significantly negative effect on performance.  Rynes (1991) 
presented a review of the literature including a number of studies in which recruitment or 
screening methods had no effect on performance. 
Other studies have presented mixed results (some positive, some negative, and some 
insignificant) for a particular method.  One review found, “There is very little evidence on the 
effectiveness of different recruitment methods for enhancing job performance and much of the 
evidence is mixed.” Milkovich and Boudreau (1997, p. 208) Another reported, “Firms can use a 
variety of methods to recruit job candidates, including newspaper advertising, employee 
referrals, and employment agencies (‘headhunters’) … Unfortunately, the findings in this 
literature are far from consistent.” (Bamberger and Meshoulam, 2000, p. 83).  A third literature 
review concluded, “The relationship between search method and earnings is less clear.  Findings 
that suggest initial wage gains for workers who found their jobs via informal contacts rather than 
formal means are dampened by studies suggesting these gains are short-lived for most 
respondents and by other studies that show no impact on wages, or even negative wage effects.” 
(Henly, 2000).  A fourth review reported, “Four studies of the association between recruitment 
source and job performance outcomes produced different findings” (Bishop, 1993, p. 357). 
(Other studies in the recruitment and screening literature deal with related issues such as 
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mechanisms through which employee referrals raise worker productivity (Staiger, 1990; Simon 
and Warner, 1992; Kugler, 2002), racial differences in extent and type of job contacts (Holzer, 
1987(b); Wilson, 1987; Korenman and Turner, 1996), and the effects of unions on recruitment 
and selection methods (Koch and Hundley, 1997)).   
In this paper we use a unique data set and new methods to identify which recruitment and 
screening methods are most effective in raising worker performance.  Because of the null and 
mixed results in the literature, entering the study we had no strong prior on which methods are 
likely to enhance performance the most.  Our goal is not simply to replicate earlier analyses 
using new data.  Our work is differentiated from the previous literature in two other ways.  First, 
we consider an interactive specification that allows for all possible two-way interactions of 
recruitment and screening methods.  Second, we estimate a model that allows for recruitment to 
affect worker performance both directly (through the usual theoretical channel of affecting the 
quality of the applicant pool) and indirectly (through changes in employers’ accompanying 
screening behavior).  Previous work has not allowed for this auxiliary effect of recruitment 
through screening.  An important goal of our study, therefore, is to determine whether the mixed 
results found in the prior empirical recruitment literature can be explained by their omission of 
implied screening effects.  By neglecting the indirect effects of recruitment choices on worker 
performance through accompanying changes in employer screening behavior, such studies might 
be missing something important.   
The recent paper by DeVaro (2005) uses the same data set we use in this paper to analyze 
the relationships among employer recruitment choices, vacancy duration, and wages.  That 
analysis explores a wage-posting theoretical framework in which employers face a multi-period 
recruitment problem, choosing recruitment methods and posting wage offers in the face of a 
trade-off between hiring speed and expected match quality.  One of the key findings to emerge is 
that recruitment methods that are slower than others in filling vacancies (such as informal 
referrals from friends) yield higher starting wages even in the presence of an extensive set of 
controls.  This finding has a natural interpretation in the context of the wage-posting model; 
methods that are slower but yield a higher-quality applicant pool imply longer vacancy durations 
and more opportunities for the employer to increase the posted wage offers as the recruitment 
campaign progresses.  While using the same data set, the present analysis differs from DeVaro 
(2005) in two key respects.  First, the analysis in DeVaro (2005) used data on recruitment 
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strategies, starting wages, and vacancy duration but did not make use of the data on worker 
performance, whereas our main objective in this paper is to study how hiring strategies affect the 
performance of new hires.  Second, while DeVaro (2005) focused only on recruitment methods, 
our analysis considers screening methods as well and their interactions with recruitment 
methods.    
The work that is most similar to ours is Holzer (1987a).  Holzer analyzed a cross section 
of 3,500 firms sampled in 1982, with information on the recruitment and screening methods used 
to obtain the most recently hired worker.  Our analysis uses a more recent data set collected by 
Holzer, namely the MCSUI, a cross section of 3510 firms sampled in 1992-1995, that is similar 
to the 1982 data.  Consistent with the rest of the empirical recruitment literature, Holzer 
considered a linear rather than an interactive specification and did not account for implied 
screening effects.  Our methodology differs from Holzer’s in two respects.  First, the main 
equation expresses worker performance as a nonlinear (interactive) function of recruitment 
methods, screening methods, and firm characteristics.  Second, in addition to the performance 
equation we incorporate seven equations that express each screening method as a function of all 
recruitment methods and firm characteristics.   
 
II. DATA, MEASURES, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The data for this study come from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a   
sample of 3,510 establishments in four metropolitan areas (Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los 
Angeles) collected between 1992 and 1995 via an employer telephone survey.  The bulk of the 
questions pertain to the most recently hired worker, and our study focuses on the recruitment and 
screening methods that were used to obtain this worker and on the worker’s subsequent job 
performance.  We also control for firm characteristics.  We present the highlights of our data set 
here and provide further details in the appendix.   
 
Outcome Measure: Worker Performance 
The dependent variable for our analysis is the employer-reported answer to the following 
question about the most recently hired worker in firm j:  "On a scale of zero to one hundred, 
where fifty is average and one hundred is the best score, how would you rate this employee's 
performance in this job?"  The question refers to the job into which the worker was initially 
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hired.  We use the performance score as a proxy for the performance of all of the workers who 
were hired by firm j in a particular time interval.  There are 2791 firms for which this dependent 
variable is reported.  As seen in the first row of Table 1, the performance score has a mean of 78 
and a standard deviation of 22.   
 Although such subjective performance ratings are frequently used as outcome measures 
in previous empirical studies on recruitment, these measures have some limitations that are worth 
noting at the outset.  First, focusing on worker performance as an outcome variable to capture the 
desirability of alternative recruitment methods neglects the fact that these methods differ in their 
costs to employers.  As noted by Holzer (1996), “Some recruitment methods (such as the use of 
private employment agencies or newspaper advertisements) are more costly than others for 
employers, but these methods may be more effective in generating the higher-quality applicants 
(or those with specialized skills) that some employers need.”  Since we lack data on the costs of 
recruitment methods, our analysis, like the literature preceding it, focuses only on the benefits 
side.  It is worth noting, however, that even if data were available on the direct costs of 
recruitment methods, the true cost of recruitment methods should be thought of more generally, 
including, for example, investments of time in soliciting referrals from current employees.  Lack 
of data on the cost side is an unfortunate defect in any empirical analysis of recruitment.     
 A second limitation is that the performance measure is subjective.  Despite some 
noteworthy exceptions, (for example, Medoff and Abraham 1980) labor economists have 
preferred to focus on objective measures of labor-market outcomes, like wages, hours of work, 
and employment rather than on subjective opinions.  We believe that the concept of performance, 
as measured by the employer-reported performance index, is worthy of study for the simple 
reason that employers quite obviously prefer to employ workers who perform well to those who 
perform poorly.  Nonetheless, we acknowledge that we are on safer ground in assuming that the 
subjective measure accurately reflects performance if we can demonstrate that the measure is 
positively associated with wages, since the wage is a measure both of the employer’s 
willingness-to-pay for the employment relationship and of the benefits that the worker receives 
from the relationship.  
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 To address this concern, we ran the following regression of the logarithm of the current 
hourly wage of the most recently hired worker on this worker’s employer-reported performance:1  
 
log(current wage)i = 1.776 + 0.005(PERF)i   N = 2432 
          (0.107)   (0.001)   
 
A performance score of 50 (which all employers are instructed to interpret as an “average” 
performance level according to the wording of the survey) is associated with an hourly wage of 
$7.58 in 1990 dollars.  A performance score of 78, which is roughly the mean performance score 
reported by employers in the sample, is associated with an hourly wage of $8.72, and a 
maximum performance score of 100 is associated with an hourly wage of $9.74.  The fact that 
higher worker performance is associated with (objectively measured) higher wages further 
supports the view that the performance measure is a reasonable object of analysis. 
 
Recruitment and Screening Methods 
The survey presents each employer with a menu of ten possible recruitment methods.  
The employer is then asked to identify those methods that were used in the campaign to hire the 
most recent worker.  The ten methods and their sample frequencies are displayed in Table 1.     
The survey questions pertaining to screening, as opposed to recruitment, are slightly 
different.  The employer is presented with a list of seven possible screening methods and is asked 
to identify those that are used for positions “of this type” (that is, of the type held by the most 
recently hired worker).  Whether or not a particular screening method was definitely used in the 
campaign to hire the most recently hired worker is unknown, since the questions only ask about 
the firm’s screening policy for positions “of this type”.  Furthermore, for five of these seven 
questions the employer is asked about the frequency with which these methods are used when 
hiring into this type of position, with possible responses including “Always”, “Sometimes”, or 
“Never”.  We recoded these five screening variables to equal one if the particular screening 
                                                 
1 Since augmented wage regressions that include demographic characteristics and human capital measures are 
substantively similar, we report only the results from the simplest specification that includes only wages.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  Wages are measured at the time of the survey and are deflated to 1990 dollars using the 
CPI-UX.  The reduced sample size (2432 instead of the full 3510) is the result of missing observations on either or 
both of the variables. 
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method is always used, and zero otherwise.  We interpret a response of “Always” to mean that 
this method was indeed used in hiring the most recent worker.  We do not recode the remaining 
two screening variables, since these do not ask about frequency; the employer is merely asked 
whether these methods are used when hiring into positions of this type.  The seven screening 
methods and their sample frequencies are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Firm Controls    
In addition to the recruitment and screening methods, our analysis includes the following 
controls for firm characteristics: whether or not the firm is for profit, whether or not it is a 
franchise, the number of sites on which it operates, the number of employees, the fraction of the 
current workforce that is unionized, whether any of the workers are temporary workers, whether 
any of the workers are contract workers, and industry identifiers.  Summary statistics for these 
firm characteristics are displayed in the lower panel of Table 1.   
 
III. METHODOLOGY: ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL RECRUITMENT 
METHODS ON PERFORMANCE 
 Virtually all empirical work on recruitment, including our study, implicitly treats the 
recruitment choices as exogenous regressors and typically estimates equations by least squares.  
The single exception, to our knowledge, is DeVaro (2004), which uses the MCSUI data to 
estimate a dynamic structural model of employer recruitment choice in which the recruitment 
decision is endogenous.  Although the recruitment decision is more appropriately treated as 
endogenous, the aggregation assumptions required in DeVaro (2004) to render that analysis 
tractable are less palatable in the present context, in which our goal is to infer the individual 
effects of multiple recruitment methods.  Furthermore, a central focus of the present study is on 
how recruitment methods indirectly impact worker performance through the auxiliary channel of 
altering the employer’s screening choices.  While enriching the DeVaro (2004) model to allow 
for these features would be conceptually straightforward, the task of estimating such a model 
would require more extensive data than are currently available.  
 We begin this section by describing the standard approach taken in most of the empirical 
recruitment literature.  We then discuss the two key respects in which our methodology extends 
the standard approach, namely allowing for interactions and for implied screening effects.  The 
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section closes with a discussion of recruitment “bundle derivatives” and how they contribute to 
our analysis.   
 
Standard Approach 
Given a cross-sectional sample of workers that spans a number of firms, the standard 
approach taken in the previous literature on recruitment (see, for example, Holzer (1987), Bishop 
(1993), DeVaro (2005)), is to regress an outcome variable on a set of recruitment dummies 
indicating which recruitment methods were used to hire the worker in question.  In some cases, 
dummies for screening methods are also included in the regression so that the “standard 
specification” may be expressed as follows:  
 
Y = a + b1REC1 + … + bKRECK + c1SCRN1 + … + cJSCRNJ + Xd + ε.  (1)   
 
In this specification, REC1 to RECK denote a set of K dummy variables indicating which 
recruitment methods were used in the campaign to hire the worker, SCRN1 to SCRNJ denote a 
set of J dummy variables indicating which screening methods were used in the campaign to hire 
the worker, X is a vector of controls for worker and firm characteristics, d is a conformable 
parameter vector, and ε is a stochastic disturbance.  The outcome variable, Y, represents either a 
subjective worker performance score or, alternatively, an objectively-measured labor market 
outcome such as turnover rate or vacancy duration.  The standard approach is to interpret the 
parameters b1 to bK as measuring the effect of recruitment choice on the outcome variable.  Our 
approach extends this framework in two key ways, as we now describe. 
 
Allowing for Recruitment-Screening Interactions  
Given that recruitment and screening methods are commonly used together in packages 
and that the effect of a particular method on performance likely depends on the use of other 
methods, it is preferable to augment the standard specification by adding recruitment-screening 
interactions.  A dimensionality problem arises when one moves to an interactive specification, 
given the large number of individual recruitment and screening methods observed in typical data 
sets (including ours).  One approach to the dimensionality problem is to use principal 
components analysis to construct indexes of recruitment and screening and to use these in the 
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regression analysis rather than the individual methods.  The simplest interactive specification 
using only the first principal components of recruitment and screening, RECPC and SCRNPC, 
is: 
 
Y = a + b1RECPC + b2SCRNPC + b3(RECPC × SCRNPC) + Xb4 + ε (2)   
 
Although the principal components analysis reduces the dimensionality of the problem, in the 
event that only a small proportion of the total variation in recruitment and screening is accounted 
for by the first principal components (as is the case in our data), it is better to leave the 
recruitment and screening methods disaggregated.  A fully interactive specification is not 
practical, however, given our sample size and the post-estimation computation of bundle 
derivatives described below, so we restrict our attention to two-way interactions, including all 
such interactions on the right-hand side of the following performance equation:2  
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This interactive performance equation, estimated using least squares, underlies the bulk 
of our empirical work.  Given estimates of the performance equation, we calculate derivatives at 
the means of the recruitment and screening variables.  These derivatives estimate the effect that 
each recruitment or screening method would have on performance holding the use of all other 
recruitment and screening methods (and firm characteristics) constant.  
 
Allowing both for Interactions and for “Implied Screening Effects” 
Although these results describe the effect on performance of a change in an individual 
method, there is good reason to believe that when a recruitment method changes, the employer 
simultaneously changes screening methods.  This means that each screening method is a function 
of the full set of recruitment methods.  A more general structure would allow each recruitment 
                                                 
2 For ease of presentation, the firm subscript j is suppressed from this and the remaining equations. 
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method to be a function of all other recruitment methods and all screening methods, and each 
screening method to be a function of all recruitment and screening methods.  To keep the 
analysis tractable, we restrict our attention only to the “implied screening effects” that result 
from allowing employers to modify their screening behaviors accordingly, given a change in 
recruitment.  Thus, in our framework recruitment methods have a direct effect on worker 
performance (since recruitment methods affect the quality of the applicant pool) and also an 
indirect or implied screening effect (since employers change their screening behavior when 
recruitment methods change). 
 To implement this functional dependence of screening on recruitment empirically, we 
specify an auxiliary screening equation for each of the seven screening methods, as follows: 
 
∑ =+=
r
srsss sRECbaSCRN ,7,...,1,       (4) 
We use the linear probability model and prefer it to the probit or logit because the slope 
coefficients are interpretable directly as derivatives.  This greatly simplifies the expressions for 
the derivatives of the performance equation.  As a sensitivity check, we verified that estimation 
of the seven auxiliary equations as probits gives results very similar to those with the linear 
probability model. 
 In summary, we estimate eight equations (the interactive performance equation and the 
seven auxiliary screening equations) by least squares.  We then use the parameter estimates to 
compute recruitment “bundle derivatives” as we now describe. 
 
Post-Estimation Computation of Bundle Derivatives 
A recruitment bundle is a set of recruitment methods used together to raise performance.  
The effect of a bundle of recruitment methods on performance is quantified by performance 
derivatives that account for implied screening effects.  Thus, the effect of a particular bundle of 
recruitment and screening methods on performance is found by totally differentiating the 
performance equation (3) and the seven auxiliary screening equations (4) with respect to a 
particular bundle of methods, denoted rB~ , used by a given firm: 
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            (5) 
 
This bundle derivative should be interpreted as the change in worker performance associated 
with using a particular bundle of methods.  After computing bundle derivatives for each firm 
there are numerous ways to analyze them and to summarize the information.  We present three 
alternative ways in the next section.   
 
IV. RESULTS 
 The key results of the paper are presented in Table 2.  Before presenting our results that 
allow for interactions and for implied screening effects, for the sake of completeness and for 
comparison purposes we present results based on the standard approach in Column 1.  This 
approach neglects the fact that many of the recruitment methods are used simultaneously in 
bundles and that the effect of an individual method can be expected to depend on the other 
methods in the bundle.  The fact that many methods are used simultaneously can be seen most 
simply in Table 3, which reveals many significant bivariate correlations among the seventeen 
recruitment and screening methods, nearly all of them positive.  In particular, 1) recruitment 
methods are complementary with other recruitment methods, 2) screening methods are 
complementary with other screening methods, and 3) screening methods are complementary with 
recruitment methods.  Given the extensive use of recruitment bundles, we expect that the effect 
of an individual method on performance depends on the presence or absence of other methods 
used by the employer.  This leads to an interactive performance specification and to our first step 
in generalizing the standard approach.   
 
Effect on Performance of Individual Recruitment Methods Allowing for Interactions  
 Given the sample size and the large number of individual recruitment and screening 
methods, a fully interactive performance specification is intractable.  In an attempt to reduce the 
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dimensionality of the problem, we first construct principal components indexes of recruitment 
and screening.  Results from the principal components analysis are displayed in Table 4.  
Unfortunately, the principal components analysis reveals that neither the recruitment nor the 
screening methods can be sensibly aggregated into indexes.  In neither case does a small subset 
of principal components account for a large proportion of the variation in recruitment and 
screening, and in fact the first principal components of recruitment and screening account for 
only about a quarter of the variation in recruitment and screening.  We therefore do not estimate 
the specification in (2).  Henceforth we work only with the individual recruitment and screening 
methods, addressing the dimensionality problem by estimating the performance equation (3) that 
includes only two-way interactions as opposed to higher-order interactions.   
 Since the interactive performance equation is nonlinear in the variables, the actual 
parameter estimates are uninteresting.  For this reason we do not report the actual parameter 
estimates but rather the derivatives of performance with respect to individual recruitment and 
screening methods, evaluating the derivative function at the means of all variables.  These results 
are shown in Column 2 of Table 2.  Such derivatives account for interactions but not for implied 
screening effects.  We see that only one method of the seventeen significantly raises 
performance, and that is checking for a criminal record.  Three other recruitment and screening 
methods are significantly associated with lower performance; we offer an explanation for this 
peculiar result in our conclusion.  Since these results allow for interactions but not for implied 
screening effects, they should be viewed as a stepping stone to our most preferred results that we 
now discuss. 
 
Effect on Performance of Individual Recruitment Methods Allowing both for Interactions and for 
Implied Screening Effects 
The preceding results neglect the fact that when certain recruitment methods are used, 
employers make corresponding changes to screening methods.  To account for this, we estimate 
the seven auxiliary screening equations and display the results in Table 5.  Most of the 
statistically significant coefficients are positive, consistent with the bivariate correlations in 
Table 3 that suggested complementarities in pairs of recruitment and screening methods.  With 
estimates from the interactive performance equation and the seven auxiliary screening equations 
in hand, we turn our attention to our preferred method (using bundle derivatives) for measuring 
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the effect of an individual recruitment method on performance.  The bundle derivative (5) 
measures the change in performance associated with the use of a particular recruitment bundle, 
taking account of interactions among recruitment methods, screening methods, recruitment and 
screening methods, and implied screening effects. After computing these bundle derivatives we 
analyze them in three different ways.   
First, we rank recruitment and screening bundles from those that raise performance the 
most to those that lower performance the most.  We then list the 20 “best” and “worst” bundles 
in Table 6 for the reader’s inspection.3  We find that many more recruitment methods are used in 
the best 20 as compared with the worst 20, whereas the number of screening methods used varies 
little between these two groups.  This suggests that firms can affect performance more by choice 
of recruitment strategies than by choice of screening strategies.     
 Second, to give the reader a sense of how prominent particular recruiting methods are 
among the best and worst bundles, in Table 7 we report the frequency with which individual 
methods are used in the best 25 percent of bundles versus the worst 25 percent.4  We find that 
there are much larger differences in the frequency with which different recruitment methods are 
used as compared with different screening methods, which parallels the results from Table 6.  
Despite these similarities, both tables are misleading in that they fail to hold other things 
constant, and for this reason our preferred method for summarizing the information from the 
bundle derivatives is the following. 
Third, we calculate the ceteris paribus effect of a particular recruitment method on 
performance taking account of implied screening effects.  For the effect of a recruitment method 
that the firm was already using in the chosen bundle, rB~ , we define a bundle rB ˆ that includes all 
of the methods in rB~  except the recruitment method of interest.  For the effect of a recruitment 
method that the firm was not using in the chosen bundle, the comparison bundle rB ˆ  includes all 
of the methods in rB~  plus the recruitment method of interest.  The derivative 
rB
PERF
ˆ∂
∂  is defined 
analogously to (5), replacing all r~  with rˆ .  The effect of an individual recruitment method on 
performance when the method of interest is included in the original bundle is .
ˆ~ rB
PERF
rB
PERF
∂
∂−∂
∂   
                                                 
3 We chose the number “20” for easy of display on a page of standard size. 
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We calculate this difference in bundle derivatives for each firm that used the method in question 
and then average them across those firms, presenting these averages for each method in Column 
3 of Table 2.  We see that none of the recruitment methods has a statistically significant effect on 
performance when we account for implied screening effects.  What is striking is that this result 
confirms the result from previous research using other data sets, but ignoring the auxiliary effect 
of recruitment through screening, that recruitment methods have no significant effect on worker 
performance. 
 
Allowing for Skill Differences through Occupations 
A potential criticism of our analysis is that while we have controlled for firm 
characteristics, we have not controlled for worker characteristics that might be correlated with 
worker performance.  Although much of the previous literature includes controls for worker 
characteristics such as demographics, such variables are omitted from all of our analyses.  In 
fact, we estimated a number of (unreported) specifications that included controls for worker 
demographic characteristics and found that our substantive results remained unaffected.  We 
therefore chose to omit the worker characteristics in the interests of parsimony, given the large 
number of parameters created by a full set of two-way interactions in the performance equation.   
Although our results appear insensitive to the exclusion of demographic characteristics, 
of potentially greater concern is the omission of controls for worker skill levels.  In estimating 
the model on a cross section of workers, we have implicitly assumed that the recruitment and 
screening strategies affect worker performance in the same ways for all workers, regardless of 
skill type.  Given that employers likely use different recruitment and screening strategies for 
high-skilled as opposed to low-skilled workers, our finding that recruitment methods have no 
effect on worker performance might reflect this aggregation of workers by skill level.  To 
address this, we estimated the main results of interest (those in Column 3 of Table 2) for two 
broad occupational subsamples.  These are: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Our choice of the first and last quartiles is arbitrary, though other choices (such as splitting the sample by the 
median or considering the first and last quintiles) yield very similar results. 
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High Skilled:  Administrative, engineering, scientific, teaching, and related occupations, 
including creative artists; technical, clerical, sales, and related occupations; precision 
production, craft and repair 
 
Low Skilled:  Service occupations, including military occupations; operators, fabricators, 
laborers; farming, forestry, fishing, and hunting occupations.     
 
We created these groups using a MCSUI question that asks employers about the type of 
job into which the most recently hired worker was hired.  Responses were coded according to the 
1980 Standard Occupational Classification, from the two to four-digit level.  We categorized 
each observation into one of the two broad occupational groups.  This occupational 
disaggregation is coarse but, given the large number of parameters that our interactive 
performance specification requires, we could not consider a finer disaggregation.  Our results are 
presented in Table 8.  Like the results for the full sample, none of the recruitment methods has a 
statistically significant effect on performance.  We therefore conclude that our original result is 
not merely an artifact of worker aggregation by skill level. 
It is interesting to note that, although none of the effects are statistically significant, many 
of the signs of the point estimates are as expected when comparing high-skilled to low-skilled 
workers.  For example, recruiting workers using help wanted advertising or accepting walk-ins 
are thought to be much more effective for lower-skilled than for higher-skilled jobs.  In fact, the 
point estimates are negative for high-skilled workers and positive for low-skilled workers.  
Similarly, recruitment through school placement officers is generally thought to be more 
effective for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers.  In fact, the point estimate is positive for 
high-skilled and negative for low-skilled workers.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have answered the question, “Which recruitment methods raise worker 
performance the most?”  Consistent with previous literature using different data and simpler 
methodologies, our main conclusion based on our preferred specification allowing for 
interactions and implied screening effects is that recruitment and screening methods do not 
exhibit a statistically significant effect on worker performance.  What is striking about this result 
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is that in contrast to earlier work, our approach allows for recruitment methods to have a direct 
effect on worker performance and also an auxiliary effect that occurs when employers change 
their screening methods to accompany a change in recruitment methods.  Previous literature has 
not allowed for such an auxiliary screening effect.  While we conjectured that the null findings 
from previous studies might be an artifact of neglecting the indirect effect of recruitment through 
implied screening effects, our results show that this is not the case and that even our enriched 
model confirms the prior work.  
Although accounting for implied screening effects did not establish significant positive 
effects in our study, we believe that future work that allows for these indirect effects of 
recruitment would be warranted.  The proposition that employers adjust their screening behavior 
in response to changes in recruitment behavior is plausible a priori, and indeed we find clear 
evidence of this in the data.  In particular, more intensive screening accompanies the addition of 
a recruitment method.  Analyses that ignore this indirect effect can potentially give misleading 
results.  We believe that although implied screening effects did not prove to be important in this 
analysis, our study highlights the general point that it is important to consider an employer’s 
recruitment and screening strategies jointly rather than in isolation. 
A promising direction for future work is to incorporate objectives other than worker 
performance into an analysis of recruitment and screening behavior.  One possibility is that firms 
choose recruitment and screening methods not just to get more productive employees but also to 
get a larger number of employees.  There are circumstances in which firms aim merely to hire 
people, provided that their performance is expected to be above some minimal threshold – fast 
food restaurants, for example.  We would have liked to have included information on the 
quantity of workers hired, but this information is absent from our data.  One implication of not 
being able to include quantity in our analysis is that when we estimated the performance 
equation we might have, and indeed did, find that some recruitment and screening methods were 
associated with lower performance.  This finding may simply reflect the purposeful pursuit of 
quantity in hiring as opposed to quality, which we see as a plausible explanation for the negative 
signs that appeared in the performance equation.   
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DATA APPENDIX: MULTI-CITY STUDY OF URBAN INEQUALITY (MCSUI) 
The Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), funded by the Russell Sage and 
Ford Foundations, is the product of an interdisciplinary team of over forty scholars from fifteen 
universities and colleges.  The study has two cross sectional components, an employer telephone 
survey and a household survey, both sampled during 1992-1995 in the metropolitan areas of 
Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles.  The employer survey contains information on firm 
characteristics, current vacancies, composition of the current workforce, and a wealth of 
information about the most recently hired employee, the most important of which, for our 
purposes, is the performance of this worker.  The number of employers who provided a 
performance score was 2791 out of 3510 total employer respondents.  The respondent was the 
owner in 14.5% of the cases, the manager or supervisor in 42%, a personnel department official 
in 31.5%, and someone else in 12%.   
Two thirds of the data is a probability sample stratified by establishment size (25% 1-19 
employees, 50% 20-99 employees, 25% 100 or more employees), drawn from regional 
employment directories provided by Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI), primarily based on local 
telephone directories.  The remaining third was drawn from the current or most recent employer 
reported by respondents in the corresponding MCSUI household survey.  Screening for these two 
sub-samples was somewhat different.  Only employers who had hired an employee in the 
previous three years for a position that did not require a college degree were included in the SSI 
sub-sample.  In contrast, in the household-based sub-sample, employers had to have hired an 
employee in the past three years into the same occupation that was held by the household 
respondent who generated the employer name.  A substantial fraction of survey questions pertain 
to these “most recent hires.”  Screening identified a respondent who actually carried out hiring 
for the relevant position, and the survey instrument took 30-45 minutes to administer on the 
telephone, with an overall response rate of 67% for screened interviews.  Sampling weights were 
constructed to correct for the complexities of the sampling scheme and weighted observations 
are a representative sample of firms, such as would occur if a random sample of employed 
people were drawn from each city.  Descriptive statistics for the recruitment and screening data 
and as well as firm characteristics are provided in Table 1.  For more information about the data, 
see Holzer (1996). 
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Definitions of MCSUI Variables and Abbreviations Used Throughout the Paper 
 
Performance Measure: 
PERF:  On a scale of 0-100 where 50 is average and 100 is the best score, how would you rate this 
employee’s performance on the job? 
 
Recruitment Variables: 
Next I would like you to indicate if you used any of the following referral or recruiting methods to fill this 
position.  (0/1 dummy where 1=Yes) 
 
Help Wanted: Did you post help-wanted signs? 
Newspaper: Did you list advertisements in newspapers?  
Walk-ins: Did you consider walk-ins without referrals?  
Current Employees: Did you ask for or accept referrals from current employees?  
State EA: How about referrals from the state employment service?   
Private EA: How about referrals from a private employment service or temp agency?   
Community EA: How about referrals from a community agency? 
School Referrals: Did you ask for referrals from schools?  
Union Referrals: How about referrals from a union? 
Friends: Did you ask for referrals from other sources (such as acquaintances, etc.)?  
 
Screening Variables: 
The following 5 questions ask about the frequency of the screening practices used by the employer when 
hiring into the position held by the most recent hire.  They are originally coded as (1=Always, 
2=Sometimes, 3=Never).  When we include these variables as regressors, we recode them as follows 
(1=Always, 0=Sometimes, Never) 
 
Application:  How often do you require a written application? 
Interview:  How often do you conduct a personal interview? 
Reference Check:  How often do you check the references? 
Education Check:  How often do you check to verify education or training? 
Criminal Record:  How often do you check criminal record? 
 
The next 2 screening questions are coded (1=Yes, 0=No) 
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Test:  Do you require a test? 
Work sample:  Do you require actual work samples? 
 
Firm Characteristics (including industry): 
All yes/no questions are coded 1=Yes and 0=No. 
 
For Profit: Is this a for-profit company? 
Franchise: Is this a franchise? 
Number of Sites: At how many sites does your firm operate? 
Size: number of regular, temporary, and contract workers  
Union:  The fraction of unionized employees working at the firm is positive if union=1. 
Temp Workers: Do you have any temporary employees? 
Contract Workers: Do you have any contract workers? 
 
What is your firm’s main product or service? (10 Industry Categories): 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation; Wholesale 
Trade; Retail Trade; Finance; Services; Public Administration 
 
current wage: Hourly wage in $1990 dollars, deflated using the CPI-UX.  This is the worker’s wage 
measured on the survey date.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Performance 78.268 22.352 
 
Recruitment Methods: 
Help wanted 0.263 0.766 
Newspaper 0.486 0.825 
Walk-ins 0.659 0.819 
Current employees 0.822 0.587 
State EA 0.351 0.821 
Private EA 0.216 0.715 
Community EA 0.281 0.795 
School referrals 0.401 0.857 
Union referrals 0.069 0.367 
Friends 0.377 0.840 
 
Screening Methods: 
Application 0.822 0.555 
Interview 0.878 0.475 
Reference check 0.757 0.559 
Education check 0.375 0.798 
Criminal record check 0.320 0.700 
Test 0.311 0.759 
Work sample 0.208 0.647 
 
Firm Characteristics: 
For Profit 0.755 0.823 
Franchise 0.061 0.326 
Number of Sites 60.432 439.829 
Size 655.919 13470.849 
Union 17.257 58.208 
Temp Workers 0.356 0.846 
Contract Workers 0.298 0.731 
Agric., Forestry, Fishing 0.000 0.014 
Mining 0.006 0.159 
Transportation 0.055 0.432 
Wholesale Trade 0.075 0.582 
Retail Trade 0.152 0.505 
Finance 0.073 0.340 
Services 0.402 0.847 
Public Administration 0.014 0.146 
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Table 2 
Effects of Recruitment and Screening on Performance 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
 
Recruitment 
Method 
Results from 
Standard 
Approach 
Results 
Allowing for 
Interactions 
Results Allowing 
for Interactions and 
for Implied 
Screening Effects 
Help wanted  -0.710 (0.925) 
0.193 
(1.081) 
-4.050 
(4.231)  
Newspaper  -1.455* (0.803) 
-1.357 
(0.837) 
3.113 
(2.453) 
Walk-ins -4.061** (0.872) 
-4.064** 
(0.995) 
-3.316 
(2.796) 
Current employees -0.490 (1.038) 
0.586 
(1.402) 
5.507 
(3.678) 
State EA 0.320 (0.899) 
-0.200 
(4.931) 
4.331 
(3.972) 
Private EA 1.871* (0.976) 
1.093 
(1.037) 
3.477 
(3.111) 
Community EA -3.099** (0.967) 
-2.895** 
(1.224) 
1.424 
(5.297) 
School Referrals 1.758* (0.932) 
1.086 
(0.943) 
-0.682 
(3.514) 
Union Referrals -1.997 (1.481) 
-2.155 
(2.227) 
5.143 
(4.985) 
Friends 0.459 (0.828) 
-0.294 
(0.883) 
3.034 
(2.357) 
 
Screening Method 
 
   
Application -1.800* (0.926) 
-2.278* 
(1.241) N/A 
Interview 1.437 (1.008) 
0.710 
(1.316) N/A 
Reference check 1.963** (0.950) 
1.479 
(1.162) N/A 
Education check 1.648* (0.924) 
1.248 
(0.979) N/A 
Criminal  record 0.748 (0.950) 
1.609* 
(0.974) N/A 
Test -2.117** (0.900) 
-1.063 
(0.926) N/A 
Work sample 2.303** (1.056) 
1.331 
(1.237) N/A 
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 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
 
Firm Controls 
Results from 
Standard 
Approach 
Results 
Allowing for 
Interactions 
Results Allowing for 
Interactions and for 
Implied Screening 
Effects 
For Profit -3.078** (1.260) 
-3.243** 
(1.186) 
-3.243** 
(1.186) 
Franchise -2.053 (1.572) 
-1.630 
(1.494) 
-1.630 
(1.494) 
Number of Sites 0.000 (0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Size 0.000* (0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Union 0.018 (0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
Temp Workers -2.345** (0.855) 
-1.641** 
(0.811) 
-1.641** 
(0.811) 
Contract Workers -1.468 (0.909) 
-0.870 
(0.898) 
-0.870 
(0.898) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing 
-16.916** 
(7.955) 
-7.855 
(8.337) 
-7.855 
(8.337) 
Mining -2.268 (4.483) 
1.270 
(4.368) 
1.270 
(4.368) 
Transportation 0.942 (1.950) 
0.015 
(1.925) 
0.015 
(1.925) 
Wholesale Trade 1.923 (1.719) 
0.399 
(1.458) 
0.399 
(1.458) 
Retail Trade 1.958* (1.128) 
2.446** 
(1.142) 
2.446** 
(1.142) 
Finance -3.099* (1.880) 
-3.071* 
(1.728) 
-3.071* 
(1.728) 
Services 1.819* (1.104) 
1.131 
(1.066) 
1.131 
(1.066) 
Public 
Administration 
-6.666* 
(3.904) 
-7.175** 
(3.514) 
-7.175** 
(3.514) 
Constant 82.663** (2.062) 
86.546** 
(3.311) 
86.546** 
(3.311) 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
Standard  errors for Columns 2 and 3 are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.
 25
Table 3 
Correlation Matrix of Recruitment and Screening Methods 
 Recruitment Method  Screening Method 
 HW News Walk-ins Curemp SEA PEA CEA School UnionR Friends
 App Inter Refcheck Edcheck Crimrec Test Wrksamp 
 
Recruitment Method         
 
       
HW 1.000                  
News 0.089* 1.000                 
Walkins 0.105* 0.228* 1.000                
Curemp 0.025* 0.091* 0.159* 1.000               
SEA 0.299* 0.198* 0.239* 0.236* 1.000              
PEA 0.049 0.103 -0.054 0.170* 0.380* 1.000             
CEA 0.192* 0.092* 0.198* 0.263* 0.513* 0.349* 1.000            
School 0.228* 0.105* 0.191* 0.224* 0.375* 0.252* 0.453* 1.000           
UnionR -0.025 -0.039 0.127* 0.080* 0.097* 0.132* 0.195* 0.040* 1.000          
Friends 0.051 -0.105 -0.364 -0.109 -0.094 -0.020 -0.090 0.059* -0.074 1.000         
 
Screening Method         
        
App 0.095* 0.092* 0.024* 0.068* 0.150* 0.112* 0.223* 0.216* -0.037 0.125  1.000       
Inter 0.054 -0.052 -0.122 -0.026 -0.149* 0.021 0.074 0.072 0.033 0.013  0.158* 1.000      
Refcheck 0.053* 0.103* -0.178* 0.058* 0.043 0.130 0.189* 0.198* 0.015 0.136  0.179* 0.129* 1.000     
Edcheck 0.012 0.022 -0.251* -0.077 0.035 0.144 0.029 0.259* -0.003 0.381*  0.172* 0.159* 0.304* 1.000    
Crimrec -0.078 -0.031 0.163* 0.105* -0.075* 0.017 0.071* 0.125* 0.143* -0.144  0.090* -0.024 0.044* 0.024* 1.000   
Test -0.071 0.121* 0.056 0.050 -0.003* 0.151* -0.087* -0.104 0.118 -0.159  0.030* -0.052 -0.119 -0.097 0.231* 1.000  
Wrksamp -0.152 -0.186 -0.161* -0.099 -0.151 -0.153 -0.163 0.004 0.162 0.258*  -0.092* 0.061 0.038 0.148* -0.107 -0.022* 1.000 
   Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Table 4 
Principal Components Analysis of Recruitment and Screening Methods 
Component Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative Proportion 
Scoring Coefficients of First 
Principal Component 
Recruitment Methods 
1 2.37 0.24 0.24 0.27 
2 1.21 0.12 0.36 0.22 
3 1.03 0.10 0.46 0.31 
4 0.94 0.09 0.56 0.29 
5 0.91 0.09 0.65 0.44 
6 0.83 0.08 0.73 0.26 
7 0.80 0.08 0.81 0.48 
8 0.71 0.07 0.88 0.39 
9 0.70 0.07 0.95 0.23 
10 0.49 0.05 1.00 0.11 
Screening Methods 
1 1.64 0.24 0.24 0.32 
2 1.17 0.17 0.40 0.22 
3 1.05 0.15 0.55 0.48 
4 0.96 0.14 0.69 0.53 
5 0.77 0.11 0.80 0.52 
6 0.74 0.11 0.91 0.27 
7 0.67 0.10 1.00 0.03 
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Table 5 
Auxiliary Screening Equations:  
How a Given Screening Method Changes with Recruitment 
 
                                                       Screening Method 
 Application Interview Reference check Educ check Criminal rec check Test Work sample 
Recruiting Method        
0.046** 0.024 0.050** -0.014 -0.032 0.040 0.011 Help wanted  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.026) 
0.071** 0.025 0.109** 0.066** -0.004 0.040 -0.033 Newspaper  (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) 
0.056** -0.008 -0.074** -0.095** 0.003 -0.030 -0.054* Walk-ins (0.026) (0.019) (0.023) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) 
0.055* 0.014 0.067** -0.031 0.035 0.021 -0.011 Current employees (0.033) (0.026) (0.030) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) 
0.039* -0.075** -0.018 0.041 0.008 0.003 -0.027 State EA (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.039) (0.040) (0.029) 
0.031 -0.007 0.025 0.017 0.008 0.096** 0.009 Private EA (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.037) (0.040) (0.042) (0.029) 
0.034 0.043* -0.001 -0.098** -0.035 0.032 0.004 Community EA (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.041) (0.048) (0.046) (0.034) 
0.018 0.018 0.016 0.137** 0.114** 0.049 0.040 School Referrals (0.028) (0.020) (0.023) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032) 
-0.020 -0.009 -0.003 0.068 0.107* 0.029 0.142** Union Referrals (0.044) (0.038) (0.054) (0.060) (0.062) (0.067) (0.070) 
-0.007 -0.034 0.032 0.097** -0.008 -0.048 0.091** Friends (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) 
0.685** 0.878** 0.718** 0.352** 0.218** 0.147** 0.209** Constant 
(0.056) (0.053) (0.046) (0.065) (0.064) (0.060) (0.057) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level and ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6 
Recruitment and Screening Methods Used in the 20 Most Performance-Enhancing and  
Least Performance-Enhancing Recruitment and Screening Bundles 
 Methods Used in Each of the Best 20 Bundles 
 Bundle Number, Where 1 is Highest and 20 is 20th Highest 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Recruitment Method                     
Help wanted     x                 
Newspapers    x    x x x x x x x   x x   
Walk-ins x x x x x  x x x x x x x x  x x x x  
Current employees x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
State EA x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Private EA  x     x x   x  x   x  x x  
Community EA x x  x x x x x x x x  x x x x  x x x 
School Referrals    x          x x     x 
Union Referral x x x x x x x  x x  x x x x  x   x 
Friends x x  x x   x     x     x   
 Methods Used in Each of the Worst 20 Bundles 
 Bundle Number, Where -1 is Worst and -20 is 20th Worst 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11 -12 -13 -14 -15 -16 -17 -18 -19 -20
Recruitment Method                     
Help wanted  x x x x x x   x x x x x x x  x   x 
Newspapers       x x      x  x  x x  
Walk-ins x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x 
Current employees x x x x x x   x x x x x x x  x   x 
State EA       x x        x  x x  
Private EA x      x       x   x    
Community EA x x     x x        x   x  
School Referrals       x x          x x  
Union Referrals x      x       x       
Friends       x x      x  x  x   
 Methods Used in Each of the Best 20 Bundles 
 Bundle Number, Where 1 is Highest and 20 is 20th Highest 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Screening Method                     
Application x  x x x x   x x x x  x x  x x  x 
Interview  x x  x  x x x x x x x x x   x x x 
Reference Check    x  x x  x x    x x     x 
Educ Check      x x  x  x         x 
Criminal Record Check      x   x x x x  x       
Test  x x x  x x  x  x x  x x  x   x 
Work sample       x              
 Methods Used in Each of the Worst 20 Bundles 
 Bundle Number, Where -1 is Worst and -20 is 20th Worst 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11 -12 -13 -14 -15 -16 -17 -18 -19 -20
Screening Method                     
Application x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x 
Interview x x  x x x x x    x x x  x  x x x 
Reference Check x x  x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x   
Education Check   x          x x  x  x   
Criminal Record Check x      x    x     x  x   
Test   x x x x x    x   x  x x x   
Work sample  x x x x x      x x       x 
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Table 7 
Difference in Frequencies of use of Recruitment and Screening Methods  
Between the “Best 25%” and “Worst 25%” of Recruitment Bundles 
 
 
Recruitment Method 
 
Difference 
Help wanted  -0.225 (0.165) 
Newspapers 0.290 (0.156)* 
Walk-ins -0.236 (0.151) 
Current employees 0.103 (0.111) 
State EA 0.265 (0.184) 
Private EA 0.314 (0.128)** 
Community EA 0.170 (0.187) 
School Referrals 0.199 (0.185) 
Union Referrals 0.073 (0.058) 
Friends 0.284 (0.145)** 
 
Screening Method 
 
Application -0.085 (0.097) 
Interview 0.011 (0.079) 
Reference Check -0.051 (0.106) 
Education Check 0.096 (0.128) 
Criminal Record Check -0.056 (0.138) 
Test 0.071 (0.128) 
Work Sample -0.110 (0.112) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.  
** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 8 
Estimated Difference in Performance Because a Particular Recruitment Method 
Was Used, Average of Firm Effects, Allowing for Implied Screening Effects 
 High-Skilled Low-Skilled 
Recruitment Methods 
Help Wanted -3.005 (5.512) [-.545] 
1.565 
(13.249) [.118] 
Newspapers  3.319 (2.740) [1.211] 
0.059 
(7.436) [.008] 
Walk-ins -5.824 (3.582) [-1.626] 
6.737 
(8.803) [.765] 
Current Employees 1.801 (4.454) [.404] 
5.586 
(11.385) [.491] 
State EA 3.443 (5.348) [.644] 
-3.752 
(9.672) [-.387] 
Private EA 2.450 (3.984) [.615] 
-6.746 
(10.182) [-.663] 
Community EA -0.041 (7.258) [-.006] 
1.053 
(11.858) [.089] 
School Referrals 2.299 (4.364) [.527] 
-6.236 
(11.507) [-.542] 
Union Referrals 11.093 (8.745) [1.269] 
-2.125 
(12.576) [-.169] 
Friends 3.532 (2.685) [1.316] 
5.971 
(7.342) [.813] 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.  ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  [t-stat]. 
 
 
